Abstract After patent expirations in pharmaceutical markets, brand-name laboratories are threatened by generic …rms' entry. To …ll the gap in the theoretical literature on this topic, we study brand-name …rms' incentives either to deter entry, or to merge with the entrant. These strategies are considered along with the possibility of the brand-name …rm producing its own generic drug, called a pseudo-generic drug. Using a vertical di¤erentiation model with Bertrand-Stackelberg competition, we show that each strategy, merging and deterring entry, may be Nash equilibrium, according to the generic …rm's setup cost level and to the rate of discount.
use a two-stage game model with product di¤erentia-tion and show the central role of cross price-elasticity in using pseudo-generic products to deter entry. Pseudo-generics drugs, by raising competitive pressure on the generic …rm, make entry deterrence easier. From this perspective, Granier and Trinquard (2006) show that this increase in competitive pressure facilitates the generic …rm's purchase by the brand-name laboratories. This justi…es our present study i.e. the trade-o¤ between mergers and barriers to entry in pharmaceutical markets.
Regarding barriers to entry, this model considers the limit-pricing strategies that consist of …xing the highest price that insures that the entrant realizes no pro…t 4 . A basic defect in the Bain/sylos limit-pricing model of entry deterrence stems from its assumption that the potential entrant believes that the established …rm would maintain its output constant if entry occurred. The problem is that if entry did occur it would not generally be rational for the established …rm to carry out this threat; thus the threat is not credible (see, e.g., Sherer, 1980, pp.246-48) . Considering asymmetric information in a Bayesian game, Milgrom and Roberts (1982) solves the credibility problem. Even if this new model can qualify the e¢ cacy of the limit-pricing strategy, in a compromise between generality and tractability, we assume generic …rms are myopic producers. Regarding mergers, we construct a model of endogenous mergers (see, e.g., Kamien and Zang, 1990 , 1993 , Granier, 2007 to better consider merger dynamics. More exactly, we study preemptive mergers. These are F o r P e e r R e v i e w initiated to prevent an unfavorable future event such as certain rival mergers (Brito, 2003, Fridolfsson and Stennek, 2005) , or in our case, such as the generic entry.
The purpose of this paper is to study the trade-o¤ between a limit-pricing strategy and a merger strategy. To achieve this aim, we develop a simple model in which a brand-name laboratory and a generic one compete à la BertrandStackelberg in a therapeutic market with vertically di¤erentiated goods. We …nd two main results. The limit-pricing strategy is always preferable to accommodating entry but the generic …rm myopic assumption quali…es this result.
Secondly, merger is preferable to entry deterrence depending on the entrant setup cost level and to the discount rate. Our paper extends Kong and Seldon (2004) , and Granier and Trinquard (2006) models. Indeed, it studies the trade-o¤ between entry deterrence and merger, also taking into account the possibility of pseudo-generic production. Moreover, it di¤ers from these two models by assuming price competition. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. In section 3, we analyze limit-pricing strategies. Section 4 is devoted to merger analysis and to its comparison with that of limit-pricing strategies. We conclude in section 5.
Model
We consider a drug market where the patent has expired. Thus, generic laboratories are able to produce. We take into account the fact that the brand-name …rm can equally produce a pseudo-generic. Consumers may choose between a brand-name product and a generic product. The brand-name producer, threatened by the generic entry, may adopt three alternative strategies: either 4 F o r P e e r R e v i e w accommodate entry or deter entry or merge as soon as a generic …rm enters the market. We de…ne a game in which these three strategies are available. By comparing pro…ts associated with these three strategies, we compute the Nash equilibrium of the game (see …gure 1). First, we present the model assumptions. Second, we establish existence conditions of the benchmark in which the three strategies can be analyzed.
Insert Figure 1 
Assumptions
The physician is considered as a perfect agent of the patient. In this context, the physician's utility and the patient's utility are one and the same. Their utility function is linear since we assume risk-neutral consumers. The absence of an insurance market is also assumed, which means that consumers pay their drugs bill in full and there is no public intervention in the market 5 . We assume a vertical product di¤erentiation because of brand loyalties 6 and uncertainty 5 « Price regulation is mainly concerned with the trade-o¤ between R&D and cost containment, while insurance is concerned with moral hazard and adverse selection problems» (Brekke et Kuhn 2006) . Our purpose is a very di¤erent one. We examine the trade-o¤ between entry deterrence and mergers. Therefore, we do not take account of health insurance and price regulation. Therefore, we do not take account of health insurance and price regulation. However, there are papers focused on price regulation e¤ects in pharmaceutical markets (e.g. Jones, Potashnik and Zhang, 2001) . 6 The empirical studies of Hudson (1992) , Hellerstien (1998 ), or Kong (2004 show the existence of brand loyalties. These studies explain swithching costs by the search costs and the uncertainty about the relative quality of the entrant.
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F o r P e e r R e v i e w in quality di¤erential in drugs. Consumers'utility function is assumed to be:
if the patient consumes the brand-name drug, if the patient consumes the generic drug, otherwise.
The variable u is the drug quality, p b the brand-name price and p g the generic price. Each consumer is characterized by a value of . This parameter is the subjective cost of switching from the branded to the generic drug. Here, it is modeled as a probability. It is the perceived probability that the generic drug is of the same quality as the brand-name one. Consumption decisions are trade-o¤s between the perceived quality of a drug and its price. The parameter is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1]. Let F ( ) be the distribution function. A patient purchases the brand-name drug if the following is true:
From this, we compute market shares. Let s g be the generic market share and s b the brand-name one:
The literature on the pharmaceutical market usually assumes negligible marginal cost and focuses on sunk costs of R&D. Here, we leave aside these sunk costs since we do not consider innovation issues. However, the generic laboratory pays a setup cost to enter the pharmaceutical market. Let F denote 6 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w the setup cost in the rest of the paper. This is not the case for the brandname …rm when it produces its pseudo-generic drug because the pseudo-generic good may be manufactured on the same production lines as its brand-name equivalent (Kong and Seldon, 2004, footnote 2) . Furthermore, we assume the brand-name producer can act as a Stackelberg leader because of brand loyalties. Moreover, the brand-name …rm and the generic …rm compete à la Bertrand 7 . We assume also the brand-name …rm has no incentive to produce several di¤erent pseudo-generic drugs 8 . Now we have de…ned the benchmark conditions, we can to study the trade-o¤ between entry deterrence, accommodation of entry and merger.
Benchmark conditions
In order to study the trade-o¤ between accommodating entry, deterring entry, or purchasing the generic …rm, we de…ne a benchmark for which entry is profitable. To elucidate the topic, we restrict the study to the case in which entry is pro…table if and only if the industry is monopolistic and there is only one entry at any time 9 . To check this assumption, a second entrant must realize no 7 Because of the …xed market demand (i.e. covered market and unit density), we assume price competition and we consider limit pricing strategy. 8 There are two justi…cations to this assumption. On one hand, brand-name laboratories have a reluctance to produce several types of pseudo-generic drugs so as not to degrade brand-loyalties from which they bene…t. Indeed, for a given therapeutic class, the generics proliferation decreases the switching cost from the brand to the generic drug (Hurwitz and Caves, 1988) . On the other hand, we note the absence of such pseudo-generic duplication in stylized facts. 9 Results are not qualitatively modi…ed if there are several entrants at the same time.
Indeed, if several …rms simultaneously enter the market, these share equally the generic market among themselves. Therefore, merger and entry deterrence strategies are una¤ected. 
Since the brand-name laboratory acts as a Stackelberg leader, we substitute the generic …rm's reaction function into the brand-name …rm's pro…t function to compute equilibrium prices and pro…ts. Thus, we obtain the following equilibrium pro…ts: 
As the two generic drugs are homogeneous, the Bertrand competition leads to a unique price on this market. Thus, the two producers share the generic market equally among themselves. Since the brand-name laboratory acts as a Stackelberg leader, we substitute the generic …rm's reaction function into the brand-name …rm's pro…t function to establish equilibrium prices and pro…ts.
Thus, the equilibrium pro…ts are:
Proof. see appendix B.
Conclusion: which structure? The brand-name laboratory compares its pro…ts in the two structures to decide whether or not to produce pseudogenerics.
The brand-name …rm, in competition with a generic …rm, produces pseudogenerics. We deduce from that the generic …rm enters the market if and only if it recovers its setup cost, that is if F < u 8 . Now, we study the case for which there are two entrants to de…ne the conditions under which a sole entry is pro…table. 
Stackelberg triopoly vs Stackelberg pseudo-triopoly
We call "pseudo-triopoly" the triopoly in which pseudo-generics are produced.
Proceeding in the same way as in section 2.2.1 but with two potential entrants, we study the brand-name …rm's decision to produce pseudo-generics. We start by analyzing the Stackelberg triopoly before analyzing the Stackelberg pseudotriopoly.
Stackelberg triopoly Let T b , T g1 , and T g2 be brand-name and generic …rms'triopoly pro…ts. These pro…ts are as follows:
Subsequently, the equilibrium pro…ts are:
Proof. see appendix C.
Stackelberg pseudo-triopoly Let P T b , P T g1 , and P T g2 be brand-name and generic …rms'triopoly pro…ts. These pro…ts are given by:
The generic market is divided into three equal shares because of the reasons mentioned in section 2.2.1. Subsequently, the pro…ts are the following:
P T g1 Proof. see appendix D.
Conclusion: which structure? The brand-name laboratory compares its pro…ts in the two structures in order to decide whether or not to produce pseudo-generics.
The brand-name …rm, in competion with two generic …rms, produces the pseudo-generic. We deduce from this that two generic …rms enter the market simultaneously or sequentially if and only if they recover their setup costs,
The pseudo-duopoly and the pseudo-triopoly are the market structures preferred by the brand-name …rm in the case of a sole competitor or of two competitors respectively. By assumption, entry is pro…table if and only if the initial structure is a monopolistic one and if there is an only one entry at a time. To check this assumption, the second entrant must realize no pro…t. By comparing the two structures, we ascertain the condition under which entry is pro…table for one …rm but not for two:
The benchmark conditions having been studied, we focus on the deterrence of the entry of the generic …rm.
Entry deterrence
In this Bertrand competition context, the brand-name …rm may have an incentive to use a limit-pricing strategy to deter entry. This strategy consists in …xing the highest price which deters entry. Since the brand-name …rm can 11 produce pseudo-generics, two sub-strategies exist. On one hand, to deter entry by producing only the brand-name good. On the other hand, to deter entry by producing the two drugs. We compare these two sub-strategies to ascertain the optimal strategy. We begin with the case in which the brand-name …rm produces only its princeps. Second, we study the case in which it produces pseudo-generics also.
Limit-pricing strategy and Stackelberg duopoly
The limit-pricing strategy consists in determining the price which maximizes the brand-name …rm's pro…t under the assumption that the generic producer realizes no pro…t:
Since the brand-name laboratory acts as a Stackelberg leader, we substitute the generic …rm's reaction function into the brand-name …rm's pro…t function to establish equilibrium prices and pro…ts. The reaction function is:
The pro…t of the generic producer must be non-positive to deter entry.
Since the brand-name …rm's pro…t function is concave, we saturate the constraint so as to establish the equilibrium brand-name good price p LD
Given that the generic …rm does not enter the market, the brand captures 
Under the benchmark conditions, the brand-name laboratory can deter entry without pseudo-generics production by …xing the equilibrium price p LD b .
Limit-pricing strategy and Stackelberg pseudo-duopoly
Proceeding in the same way as in the previous section, the maximization problem becomes:
s=c
Inserting (25) and saturating the constraint, we deduce the equilibrium
Given that the generic …rm does not enter the market, the brand captures
, the limit price exceeds the consumer willingness to pay. The …rm cannot …x this price, but in this case, the generic producer does not enter (see section 2.2.1). Thus, the equilibrium brand-name …rm's pro…t is:
= 2 p 2F u 2F . 
Optimal limit-pricing strategy
In order to determine the optimal limit-pricing strategy, we compare brandname …rm's pro…ts in the two sub-strategies: to produce or not pseudogenerics. By assumption, only one generic …rm has an incentive to enter the market if condition (23) holds. Moreover, the two sub-strategies are applicable if condition (23) holds. The di¤erence between the two pro…ts is:
This expression is a trinomial which admits two roots F 1 and F 2 10 . The benchmark conditions are between these two roots. We deduce from this:
Therefore, the optimal limit-pricing strategy is that in which the brand- 
Proposition 1 The limit-pricing strategy dominates the accommodation strategy.
Proof. see appendix E.
As we have already said, this result assumes a myopic generic …rm, since by entering the market, this …rm incites the brand-name …rm to modify its strategy by …xing competitive prices.
Deter entry or merge?
The previous section underlines that entry deterrence strategy dominates accommodation strategy. The merger strategy is equivalent to the entry deterrence strategy. Indeed, it prevents the generic …rm from producing. After studying the merger path, we analyze the relative pro…tability of the two strategies.
An alternative to entry deterrence: the "anticipative" merger
In the benchmark, we consider one potential entry in each period. Thus, we study the merger in a dynamic context. The brand-name …rm must purchase one …rm in each period. As the generic …rm is bought before entering the market, this merger is called "anticipative" merger 11 . This merger is equivalent 1 1 This idea belongs to a broader concept called preemptive merger. This is studied in endogenous merger literature. These mergers are initiated to prevent an unfavorable future event such as certain rival mergers (see, e.g., Brito, 2003, Fridolfsson and Stennek, 2005) . In our case, the unfavorable event is a generic entry. to a premium paid by the brand-name …rm to prevent competition. The merger allows the brand-name producer to realize a monopoly pro…t. On the other hand, this …rm has to purchase each entrant. We deduce a net merger gain.
Monopolization
Therefore, we study the brand-name monopoly, achieved by merger. Let M b be the monopoly pro…t. This pro…t is the gross merger gain for one period.
The monopoly can extract the whole consumer surplus by selling the most valued drug to each consumer since the brand-name …rm need not sell pseudo- 
Buying price
According to the benchmark, only one generic …rm has an incentive to enter the monopolistic market at each period. Such an entrant must, to set up in the market, invest in a production unit represented by a setup cost F . As soon as the potential entrant invests, the brand-name …rm tries to purchase it to stay in a monopolistic situation. The repurchase process is a simultaneous auction 1 2 The monopoly is a mono-product one but this must be nuanced because there is no insurance market. Such a market would incite the monopoly to produce pseudo-generics because of the reimbursement di¤erential if we assume a non-covered drug market. This scenario would be more in accordance with empirical reality. which it would realize by refusing to be sold, it gives a reservation price 13 equal to this pro…t. By anticipating this, the brand-name …rm bids at this level, called generic …rm's buying price. We consider the auction mechanism as an instantaneous one. This mechanism takes place at the moment of the generic entry. Thus, no other …rm has an incentive to enter the market since there is already an entry at this period. Therefore, the buying price is the actualized in…nite ‡ow of gross pro…t the generic …rm would realize by entering the market. Let be the discount rate with 0 < < 1 and let BP (u; ) be the buying price:
Net merger gain
Let G(F; u; ) be the net merger gain. It is equal to the gross merger gain minus the buying price. As the game horizon is in…nite, the gross merger gain is an actualized in…nite ‡ow of monopoly pro…t. The buying price is paid in each period because there is an entrant to purchase in each period.
We …nd the net merger gain is positive for < and negative for > with = 
"Anticipative" merger strategy vs limit-pricing strategy
To solve the game, we compare two strategies: to merge with each entrant or to deter entry ad vitam aeternam. We compare the net merger gain with the actualized in…nite ‡ow of limit-pricing pseudo-duopoly pro…t. Let M LI(F; u; ) be the di¤erence between these payments. If M LI(F; u; ) is positive, then the merger path is the Nash equilibrium of the game.
Let (F; u) be the level for which M LI(F; u; ) = 0:
Proposition 2 The entry deterrence by the limit-pricing strategy is the Nash equilibrium of the game if > (F; u). By contrast, the merger strategy is the Nash equilibrium of the game if < (F; u). Moreover, (F; u) (see …gure 2) is decreasing in F and 0:5 < (F; u) < 0:643 for the setup cost values allowing the benchmark existence.
Proof. see appendix G.
Insert Figure 2 The interpretation of proposition 2 is as follows. There is a trade-o¤ between the two strategies that depends on the discount rate level. If this is low ( < (F; u)), it reduces the value of future payments in the merger path.
The merger tends to be more pro…table. If this is high ( > (F; u) the value of future payments in the merger path. The merger tends to be less pro…table. Moreover, the higher the setup cost is, the lower the discount factor threshold (F; u) is. Therefore, the area of pro…tability of entry deterrence increases. This is due to the fact that the increase in setup cost makes the deterrence of a generic competitor easier. Note also that if > , the net merger gain is non-positive and the entry deterrence strategy is always preferred. For (F; u) < < , the net merger gain is positive but not enough to o¤set the pro…tability of the entry deterrence strategy. For < (F; u) < , the net merger gain is positive and exceeds the entry deterrence gain.
Concluding remarks
The entry of generic drugs in the pharmaceutical market encourages brandname laboratories to use anti-competitive practices to stay in a monopolistic industry. More precisely, this article analyzes two anti-competitive practices:
the "anticipated" merger strategy and the limit-pricing strategy. Each strategy may be implemented with or without pseudo-generics production. This topic is analyzed in a vertical di¤erentiation model, in which laboratories compete à la Bertrant-Stackelberg. As to the pro…tability of the two strategies, we report the following …ndings: …rst, the entry deterrence is always preferable to entry accommodation. This result must be quali…ed by the credibility problem associated with the limit-pricing strategy. Secondly, "anticipated" merger is preferable to entry deterrence depending on the setup cost level and on the rate of discount level.
Three research perspectives appear in this simple model. First, we assume a myopic generic …rm. Taking into account a Bayesian reasoning to elabo- to produce pseudo-generics if we assume a non-covered drug market 14 . This scenario would be closer to the empirical reality (e.g, Hollis, 2002 Hollis, , 2003 .
Moreover, competition authorities could block the merger. However, taking synergies into account could modify this decision, all the more so since the monopoly may produce pseudo-generics. Finally, to explain the presence of only one pseudo-generic product, we might consider the fact that the switching cost from the brand to the generic drug decreases with generic proliferation.
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Appendix A
The generic …rm's reaction function is given by the …rst order condition:
The generic …rm's pro…t function is concave in p g since the second order condition is checked:
Therefore, the generic …rm's reaction function is: Thus, the brand-name …rm's pro…t can be rewritten:
The …rst order condition of the brand-name …rm's pro…t function determines the branded good equilibrium price:
The second order condition holds since:
We deduce the following equilibrium prices and market shares:
Appendix B
Proceeding in the same way as in the appendix A, the brand-name …rm's pro…t can be rewritten:
The price maximizing the pro…t function is: 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 = u. We establish the following equilibrium prices and market shares:
F o r P e e r R e v i e w
The price maximizing the pro…t function is: = u. We report the following equilibrium prices and market shares:
This di¤erence is a trinomial admitting two roots: The benchmark conditions are between these two roots. Therefore, we obtain:
Appendix F
We study the sign of the net merger gain. We derive the net merger gain function in . 
Appendix G
We search for M LI(F; u; ) sign. This one is the same than the sign the function numerator. Thus, we derive this numerator in .
This derivative is a trinomial admitting two roots:
The benchmark conditions imply the negativity of M LI(F; u; ) derivative (in ). We compute the M LI(F; u; ) root in :
Under the benchmark conditions, we study this root:
(F; u)
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Therefore, the generic …rm's reaction function is:
Thus, the brand-name …rm's pro…t can be rewritten:
The second order condition holds since: We deduce the following equilibrium prices and market shares:
Appendix B
The second order condition holds since: = u. We establish the following equilibrium prices and market shares:
Appendix C
The generic …rms'reaction function is given by the …rst order condition:
The generic …rms' pro…t function is concave in p g since the second order condition is checked:
Therefore, the generic …rms'reaction function is:
Thus, the brand-name …rm's pro…t can be rewritten: The …rst order condition of the brand-name …rm's pro…t function determines the branded good equilibrium price:
Appendix D
The generic …rms'pro…t functions are concave in p g since the second order condition is checked:
Therefore, the price maximizing the pro…t function is:
Condition (2) implies that p P T b u, so, Appendix E
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